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I. INTRODUCTION 
"I  believe, it (. .  .  JIT. ..) is truly the best option for  Western companies 
and  an  option  that  should  be  explored  by  every  company" 
Hay (1  988) 
Many textbooks, academic and industry magazines have been singing 
the praises of JIT (Just-In-Time). Since its "discovery" by western ma- 
nufacturing companies, JIT has been attributed remarkable benefits. 
Statements like "20 to 50 percent increases in direct and indirect labor 
productivity, 30 to 40 percent increases in equipment capacity, 80 to 
90 percent reductions in manufacturing lead time, 40 to 50 percent 
reductions in the cost of failure (scrap, rework, and warranties), 8 to 
15 percent reductions in the cost of  purchased material, 50 to 90 per- 
cent reduction in inventories, 30 to 40 percent reductions in space re- 
quirements" that made their appearance in the operations manage- 
ment literature (Hay 1988), have tempted many companies to jump 
on the JIT bandwagon. For many of  its enthusiasts, JIT is no longer 
a production control system ;  it has become a creed. The message that 
can be learned from both theory and practice seems to be that Just- 
in-Time manufacturing can work in any manufacturing environment, 
in any industry  (Hay (1988)). 
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p!es  - elimination of waste, total quality creation, human resource in- 
volvement, continuous improvement, just to mention these few - are 
universally desirable results and have been so ever before the advent 
of JIT ;  and JIT appeared to offer all these desirable results. The pur- 
pose of  this paper is not to criticize JIT as such and its underlying 
good principles. Our basic objective is to raise some warnings against 
blind  adherence to JIT and against being carried  away by  its 'halo' 
effect, if  any. 
The origin of JIT lies in the Japanese automobile industry (Mon- 
den (1983), Ohno (1988a), (1988b)); i.e., repetitive discrete flow item 
manufacturing of  relatively standardized products using rather stan- 
dard mature technology.  It was a pull system applied to simple as- 
sembly type of  operations, resulting in lower inventory levels and a 
better operational flexibility (responsiveness), largely due to various 
improvements of  the production environment and production para- 
meters. However, it has now ballooned disproportionately and many 
attempts have been made to implement it in production environments 
which  are completely different from the ones originally  aimed for 
(Ohno and Mito (1988), Shinohara (1988)). There seems to be no ex- 
cuse for not using JIT (Walleigh  1986). Thus, a word of  caution is 
at place here. Blind adherence to a number of common JIT rules and 
beliefs may result in strategic damaging consequences, either because 
they are incorrectly implemented as such or are used in a wrong en- 
vironment. 
The analysis presented in this paper is mainly based on in-depth 
discussions  with  fifteen  top-level  managers  operating  in  various 
manufacturing industries within Europe (automobile, textile, consu- 
mer electronics, steel, consumer products and the pharmaceutical in- 
dustry). The reactions heard during these discussions  ranged  from 
"JIT is a necessity" to "JIT  is utopia". This asks for some clarification. 
11. JIT DOCTRINES AND BELIEFS 
In this section we analyze some of  the best-known  "dictums", "do's 
and don'ts"  and "beliefs" surrounding JIT. They are assembled in 
more general themes such as JIT and capacity, JIT and suppliers, JIT 
and employees, etc. A. JIT and capacity 
"Set-up time reduction leads to smaller batch sizes, shorter through- 
put times and consequently redzlced inventories and increased mar- 
ket responsiverzess. This finally res~ilts  in lower costs." Hall  (1  983), 
Hay  (1988), Morzden  (1983), Schonberger  (1981). 
The argument is  appealing. Reduced set-up times allow for smaller 
batches. This leads to reduced waiting lines, short material flow time, 
reduced throughput time, reduced customer order delivery times, in- 
creased market responsiveness. However, the fundamental question 
is : "How do we  do it ?" 
There is no denying that in a repetitive manufacturing environment 
of  mature products and the use of  rather standardized, conventional 
and mature manufacturing technology, effective set-up reduction on 
bottleneck facilities can be achieved at often low cost (Shingo (1985)). 
However, blind set-up reduction on non-bottleneck activities may be 
a pure waste  of  money  (Goldratt  and Cox  (1984)). In addition, it 
should be appreciated that set-up reduction does not happen over- 
night but may take several years (Shingo (1985)). Vely often, set-up 
reduction and its synergetic chain of  benefits are achieved through 
process innovation. It may involve a heavy deployment of  state-of-the- 
art manufacturing and tooling technology, heavy investments in (fle- 
xible) automation (flexible manufacturing  (FMS) and assembly sys- 
tems (FAS)), and capital intensive material handling systems (AGVS, 
ASIWS). Quite often it involves point-of-use manufacturing facilities 
and standby machines. Set-up time reduction comes at a price. 
The finance director of  a large  textile  company, reputed for its 
widespread JIT efforts on the factory floor, figured out that the capital 
intensity has gone up, as the inventory to gross revenue ratio has come 
down.  Almost  all  of  our  interviewees  had  the  same  experience. 
Moreover, some mentioned that profitability  had eroded (which of 
course depends on many other factors). The point is that JIT asks for 
flexible capacity - sometimes overcapacity (Schonberger (1981)), not 
only for the sake of  reduced inventories, but also to satisfy the need 
to be close to the customer as witnessed by  increased direct foreign 
investments  in  smaller, focused  plants  near  major  customers.  We 
clearly see a substitution of inventory by fixed assets. This substitution 
effect is clearly illustrated in the figure below (for a company in the 
computer industry). Goldratt (1984) defines inventory as all the mo- ney that is invested in the system. According to this definition, the 
inventory increased in a number of  JIT companies. A JIT advocate 
will claim that the efforts to improve the manufacturing process will 
automatically unfreeze the additional capacity required. We believe 
that this may not always be the case. 
FIGURE  1 
Substit~ition  of  Inveiztoly  by Fixed Assets 
INVENTORY DOWN CAPITAL INTENSITY UP 
A COMPANY IN THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 
The increased capital intensity issue is a major concern to many 
managers. Fixed assets such as machines or buildings can quickly turn 
into "fixed liabilities" when the business takes a downward trend. 
It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that inventory reduction can 
be achieved in many different ways. One way is to have flexible (over) 
capacity. For certain industries, for example those using rather inex- 
pensive, conventional, standard machinery, this may be the ideal stra- 
tegy. However, the story may be completely different for the inherent- 
ly capital-intensive plants making use of very expensive machines avai- 
lable in limited supply. These plants have to face the reality of bottle- 
necks. In this case, the so-called load oriented planning systems may 
offer a better alternative to JIT. In a load oriented planning system 
we have to control the release of material, which cannot be at a higher 
rate than the absorption rate of  the bottleneck. We refer the reader 
to the literature (Goldratt and Cox (1984), Jones and Roberts (1989), 
Wiendahl (1987), Karmarkar (1989)) for more details. Managers of capital intensive plants in the steel industry for exam- 
ple, view inventory in a different way than their colleagues in the less 
capital intensive industry. As a Managing Director of  a steel-trans- 
forming plant puts it : "having more inventory is not as bad as having 
to live with one investment decision that went wrong". In an assembly 
plant  on the other hand, raw materials  and components are often 
made up of  high-value added items while the assembly process itself 
is a fairly simple process that does not require substantial capital in- 
vestment and that does not add substantial value. Consequently, in- 
ventories constitute a major cost component that may be considered 
as "evil". 
"Stockless production  is more than a set of  established techniques 
to be installed. It is a fundamental  way of  thinking. " Hall (1983). 
"Holding inventories, in particular b~lffer  stocks, is evil. It is bad 
for  the manufactuting process."  Hall  (1983). 
"The balancing act. The importance of  uniform plant load." 
Hay  (1  988). 
Strive for a "levelled, synchronized production"  says the JIT ma- 
nual. Basically this means, "manage your demand function". In a sta- 
ble demand environment - typical for repetitive manufacturing envi- 
ronments where 'a little bit of everything is made every day' - the dri- 
ving force at the final assembly stage can be a mixed-model sequence 
which sprouts the various pulling cycles. The concept of  mixed model 
production is not bad as such. The crucial point is that very often the 
underlying assumption of  a stable repetitive demand which allows for 
deterministic, stable and often frozen master production schedules is 
not met. If  there are wide fluctuations in product demand, holding 
inventories at effective levels in the production process might be a 
blessing. 
Inventory is neither evil nor good. Inventories do often play a stra- 
tegic role. A manufacturer in the electronics industry uses the concept 
of  Strategic Driven Inventory. Inventory is not the root-cause of  all pro- 
ductionllogistics problems; bad planning and thoughtless application of 
narrow theories and dogmas are. In many practical settings holding in- 
ventories is necessary because of  uncertainties, process time variabi- 
lities, capacity limitations,  process  decoupling, etc. (Conway et al. (1987), Jackson (1991)). The JIT philosophy asks us to eliminate that 
need. In many practical  settings, however, the favorable conditions 
of  the repetitive automobile industry (modular approach, stable de- 
mand patterns, etc..) are absent. Manufacturers often have to deal 
with more product variety, unreliable processes andlor unpredictable 
yields (e.g. chip production),  utterly new,  advanced  and immature 
technology. As a consequence, uncertainty and instability are unavoi- 
dable, at least during the burn-in years of  the manufacturing process. 
JIT-ting in unstable process  technology  environments  may present 
problems that may  effectively kill the throughput of  the company. 
B. JIT  and  Suppliers 
"In the Japanese style of  man~~facturing,  two things are vital: the 
elimination of  waste in production and stocks by  'just-in-time' de- 
livery ofparts; and close co-operation with parts suppliers over qua- 
lity as well as R&D. Both require proximity."  The Economist, Fe- 
bn~ary  23,  (1991) 
"Stockless  production has much larger goals than just  inventory re- 
duction. The intent is to strengthen the production  capabilities of 
both customers and suppliers. Inventoly may temporarily be shifted 
to suppliers in the course of  doing so, but the long-tern goal is to 
reduce inventoly everywhere." 
"The objectives with suppliers, in order,  are  (l)  eliminate safety 
stocks, and  (2) eliminate incoming inspection and  sorting." 
"There are many instances in which one part  is found  only in one 
place. " 
"Another misconception about stockless production is that compa- 
nies merely push their inventory onto their suppliers. That is not tnle 
of  the large suppliers. It  is not tn~e  of  the small s~~ppliers  either." 
Hall  (1983) 
Subcontracting companies occupy a rather peculiar place in Japanese 
industry. The  big repetitive manufacturing firms (e.g. Toyota) rely lar- 
gely on subcontracting for what seems to be good reasons (Herroelen 
(1984), Juckler (1984), Van Wassenhove  (1984)). They refrain from 
vertical integration and produce  only their key  (strategzc) parts. Their real know-how is in handling a large number of  parts, i.e. in an ef- 
ficient ~rganization  to asse~ble  these parts into a firra! product over 
and over again. Toyota receives several advantages from subcontrac- 
ting a large nun?  ber of relatively simple parts. Small subcontractors can 
produce these parts a lot cheaper since they do not face the large over- 
head costs which big companies such as Toyota have to face. Big firms 
can put several subcontractors in competition for the same relatively 
simple parts, which helps in cutting prices. Big companies like Toyota 
impose learning curve tactics on their subcontractors forcing them to 
reduce their costs (and prices) every year. Most small subcontractors 
are entirely dependent upon one big firm and are therefore in no po- 
sition to object (Van Wassenhove (1984)). This view is also confirmed 
by  Moritani (1982) who states that "The component subcontractors 
bear the brunt of price competition. The big manufacturers, in fierce 
competition with each other, try to beat down the price of  parts as 
much as possible in order to maintain competitiveness of their export 
products. The subcontractors are in no position to refuse". 
Ask any so-called Western JIT company and they will tell you that 
they became very demanding with respect to their suppliers. A strong 
JIT supplier network seems to be a must, resulting in 'strengthened 
production capabilities of both the customer and supplier'. Without 
any doubt, there are many situations where "the supplier has learnt 
to manage its operations more efficiently and it has  cut down  the 
costs". Nevertheless we would  like  to raise  some warnings  against 
blind faith in the supplier network. 
Before we dig into our main arguments, we should be aware of the 
following. Subcontracting Inay have a number of reasons and subcon- 
tractors may be of different types. In a MITI report (19821, it is stated 
that Japanese mother companies mainly subcontract because subcon- 
tracting  companies  have  specialized  technology  and  specialized 
equipment, because subcontractors have the capacity that the parent 
company is lacking, because subcontracting provides them greater flexi- 
bility towards lot size fluctuations, lower costs of personnel and equip- 
ment. From the outset we must realize that the Japanese word "sub- 
contractor" (actually they have different words for the several types) 
can cover a wide variety of situations. Some subcontractors are simply 
subsidiaries created and owned by the mother companies. Their ac- 
tivities are completely tied to the main company. Some are indepen- 
dent  companies,  which  became  authorized  suppliers,  often  not 
allowed  to  supply  other  mother  companies.  Some  companies  are independent  and supply  to many companies  (Hall (1983), Juckler 
(1984)). 
Genuine  JIT  means  synchronized  manufacturing:  the  supplier 
makes the required item just-in-time for the mother company to use 
it in its own manufacturing operations. Even in the repetitive discrete 
item manufacturing environment where true JIT was born - the car 
industry - achieving JIT supplies may be a tremendous task. In a study 
of  car-parts makers in the European Community, carried out for the 
European Commission by the Boston Consulting Group, it is disco- 
vered that only nine firms succeeded to implement examples of  ge- 
nuine JIT operations (The Economist (1991)). In most cases, theparts- 
makers have simply invested in 'buffer-stock'  warehouses close to the car 
maker's plant from  which frequent  deliveries are  made. 
In addition, there are good reasons for not relying solely on real JIT 
supplies. Even Japanese companies do not have JIT supplies for all 
the items they need. It seems logical to rely on JIT supplies (small 
lots, frequent deliveries just-in-time) for relatively high valued, high 
quality items which can be delivered  over short distances with low 
transport  costs by  a reliable transportation  system. 
Given all the good reasons for and side remarks on subcontracting, 
there is, however, a key problem which can be summarized as follows. 
Where a mother company may be operating in a perj5ect  JITproduction 
environment (e.g. repetitive assembly of standard products), this may not 
be necessarily the case for  its suppliers. A good example is provided by 
the assembly plants of personal computers vis-h-vis the supplier plants 
where the semiconductor chips are made. Both clearly operate in a dif- 
ferent production environment - the well established flow  line versus the 
yield-suffering job  shop, but they are  both part  of  the same network of 
mutual dependency. As a result, the supplier company - forced to ope- 
rate in what could be called  a non-JIT biotope  - may be forced or 
deliberately opts for JIT supplies. How does it cope with that ? One 
large steel company mentioned that they had to increase the stock 
of  finished products by  an equivalent  of  four weeks. Another steel 
company was forced to set up a separate focused plant, in another 
continent, close to their customer. This dedicated plant does not offer 
the full scale of steel products, but only a limited range. The question 
is whether the return of  such a heavy investment is sufficient to offset 
the diseconomies of  multiple plant locations. When the economy is 
booming, not many may feel the pinch ;  but when the economy goes 
bust, it would spell disaster. Many companies decide to outsource components for  the simple rea- 
son that producing them in their own JIT environment is too problematic. 
Can we expect that the supplier will do better ? A car assembly plant 
for example, may decide to outsource the production of  painted car 
bumpers because matching the car body sequence on the assembly 
line with the bumper sequence creates nightmares. Will the bumper 
supplying company be capable of  doing better in the sense of  making 
just-in-time mixed-model bumper deliveries along the final assembly 
line ? 
The General Manager of Purchasing and Materials Supply of a lar- 
ge computer company states that the purchasing lead times of several 
class A items, such as discs and semiconductors, remains a serious 
problem. Similarly, power supplies, plastic mouldings and chassis for 
the mainframe computers are far from being supplied just-in-time. 
For  these  items, the lead  times  are running  in  several weeks  or 
months. For some of the items, the lead times have in fact increased, 
due to special customer specifications. 
In addition, supplier chains may go  several levels deep. Suppliers do 
have their own suppliers. In a supplier chain, the weakest link determines 
the chain's peformance. Moreover, an improvement induced in one 
link of  the chain does not necessarily lead into an improvement of 
the entire chain. A recent study of  the supplier networks in Belgium 
(Plouvier and Ramioul (1990)) revealed  that the small to medium 
sized companies cannot always assure the required capacity and the 
necessary  investments  in information technology. 
Another issue of  deep concern is the fact that a number of  well 
integrated companies run the risk of  loosing their engzneering basis due 
to the increased emphasis on outsourcing. A well-known cbmputer pro- 
cessor chip maker, had to call in Malaysian experts from its Penang 
factory to help set up the chip assembly line at an automated chip- 
making factory it started building in Arizona some years ago. None 
of  its U.S. employees had that expertise any longer (Business Week 
(1986)). 
Another point of  major concern related to close supplier networks 
has to do with the possibility  of  a potential business conflict. The idea 
behind a sole-supplier relationship is that you share information with 
the supplier, discuss design issues, participate in product development 
and  research,  exchange  information  on production  plans,  future 
needs, etc. Suppliers should know the mother company as an insider, 
and should behave like one. Most of our interviewees were concerned about this issue. An important company supplier may also be a sup- 
plier to the mother company's major competitors, Mother companies 
do not appreciate that a number of company secrets (product and pro- 
cess  innovations,  advanced  production  process  technology, just  to 
name a few) are "supplied" to their competitors. The problem is not 
necessarily typical of  JIT-marriage relationships. But given the close 
relationships required by  the JIT supplier chain - including joint  re- 
search - the problem has become acute. Some companies try to pro- 
tect themselves through legal contracts (rules of  conduct); others are 
forced to go as far as monopolizing the supplier. 
C. JIT and  employees 
"The  responsibility for  quality rests with the makers of  the part.  The 
only affordable way to control quality in allprocesses is for  workers 
to do it themselves. Production foremen  should  be  the quality ex- 
perts.  Total involvement means a sharing in the quality control res- 
ponsibility  by  all plant  employees." Schonberger (1982). 
"The attitude of  management toward the workers is also critical- 
... The Japanese say  'What workers are doing today is only tapping 
their capability. We must give  them an opportunity to do more: " 
Chase and Aquilano  (1989). 
"The culture of  employee involvement, of  teamwork, must be  de- 
veloped in a company in order for  JIT to work. There are three main 
areas that need  to be explored :  (I) Work force flexibility  (job des- 
criptions, work practices,  cross  training, working in teams rather 
than individually), (2)  Employee involvement (self-  inspection, pro- 
blem solving, continuous improvement, (3) Teamwork (risk taking, 
willingness to experiment, cooperation across departmental lines)." 
Hay  (1988). 
No system depends on the employee as much as the JIT (pull) system, 
and, perhaps, no system takes the employee for granted as much as 
the JIT system. JIT-workers are expected to be multifunctional, are 
expected to solve quality problems, are expected to work in groups, 
are expected to be set-up reduction masters, are expected to kick on 
quality circles, are expected to use their brains. How are we so sure that this type of super-employee exists ? How are we so sure that JIT- 
employees like the requirements imposed on them ? 
The first assumption we want to relax is that JIT workers are the 
single source of  quality. We do not argue that quality involvement 
should not start at the workplace, nor that quality achievement is not 
part of  the worker's  responsibility. We only want to stress that em- 
ployees on the floor alone, will not get the job done. Jungi Noguchi, 
General Manager of  the Union of  Japanese Scientists and Engineers 
(JUSE) states that "Workers and foremen can solve only 15 percent 
of  all quality control problems. The rest must be handled by  mana- 
gement or the engineering  staff"  (Noguchi  (1981)). Juran himself 
(Juran (1981)) is quoted for saying that "There is no possibility for 
the workforce to make a major contribution to solving a company's 
quality problems". 
Moreover, JIT dictates the management  system should provide 
every worker with an opportunity to display his or her maximum ca- 
pabilities. It is imperative that the management system should believe 
that workers can do much more than they are now given the oppor- 
tunity to do. Of  equal importance, however, is the question whether 
the workers welcome this. Working in a JIT  environment may be de- 
manding and stressful. To quote Klein (1989): 'NOW  they (employees) 
have targets every day, now you're under the gun all the time'. Indeed, 
JIT requires strict adherence to rigid methods and procedures ;  floor 
discipline is a must. At the same time management fully exploits the 
possibilities offered by the flexible labour time systems (shift systems) 
and new forms of  job  content (multifunctionality). It is crucial that 
managers should have a clear idea of  workers'  expectations. 
During our interviews, managers admitted that the JIT implemen- 
tation is still very much a top-down approach and that it has not yet 
taken up at the grassroots level. It requires a great deal of  trust and 
this is a two-way street. How can an employee be expected to remain 
faithful to whatever 'more' is asked when the company had to reduce 
the number of  employees, while company sales went up. Faithfulness 
is a two-way process. You  cannot ask what you cannot give. 
Saying that JIT is still much of  a top-down approach, however, is 
not denying that bottom-up gathering of  information is crucial. One 
of the competitive advantages of Japanese manufacturers seems to be 
their way of  gathering information within their own firm and using 
it to take decisions. Compared with the stereotyped western firm, they 
seem to operate from the bottom up rather than the top down. In- formation flows freely up the organization, and decisions are taken 
at. or at least initiated, at relatively low levels. 'The generals rarely 
send orders to the troops. The troops send orders to the generals, for 
their approval' (The Economist  (1991)). 
D. JIT  and strategy 
"Just-in-Time (JIT)  production systems are changing the way ma- 
nufacturing organizations do business. Like MRP in the 1970s, JIT 
systems are at least contemplated by virtually every major manufac- 
turing organization." Chase and Aquilano  (1989). 
As we mentioned in the introduction of  this paper, the origin of  JIT 
lies in the Japanese automobile industry ;  i.e., repetitive discrete item 
flow manufacturing of  relatively standardized products using rather 
standard mature technology. Repetitive discrete item manufacturing 
- production systems that make the same basic product over and over 
again - is the natural biotope of  genuine JIT. This biotope is where the 
genuine JIT tree grows best : a repetitive environment (make a little 
bit of everything every day) which allows for stabilized, levelled master 
production  plans  which  sprout  mixed-model  final  assembly plans 
aimed at keeping the usage rate of  components and subassemblies as 
level as possible and which create the necessary conditions for a re- 
latively simple system of production control - the pulling cycle. A le- 
velled production plan, however, is not enough. SufSicient conditions 
are created by very simple mechanisms and procedures for authori- 
zing  production  and transportation  (the Kanban  control  system), 
small lot sizes, set-up reduction andlor elimination on bottleneck ma- 
chines, physical reorganization on the production floor exploiting as 
much as possible the benefits of  line or cell layouts, and just-in-time 
supplies. This synergetic chain of  necessity-sufficiency relationships 
goes several layers deep, culminating at the kernel of  total quality 
creation. 
The apparent productivity and competitive success of the Japanese 
repetitive manufacturing industry shook the western manufacturing 
industry. As the various links in the above mentioned synergetic chain 
of genuine JIT penetrated in the western manufacturing world, each 
individual branch of  the genuine JIT tree was  discovered, studied, 
pampered and cultivated by  its own. Many of the branches were used 
as  cuttings  to  grow  unhealthy  JIT  trees  in  unnatural  biotopes, many of  them were severely mistreated, others ballooned dispropor- 
tionate!y  with the result that the cultivators no longer see the wood 
for the trees. "Full-fledged JIT" was born and became a new mana- 
gement philosophy, became a must. The point is, blind adherence to 
the individual branches of  the JIT tree may have strategically dama- 
ging consequences. 
Flexibility, product  variety,  short  lead  times,  operational speed  are 
sound branches of  the JIT tree, but need not always be  the top priority 
items in a conzpany's  strategic  basket. In addition, all of  them might 
come at a cost. Flexibility is not easy to achieve and comes at a price. 
Very often, it is pursued through capital intensive investments with 
high exit barriers. A steel company may be tempted to advel-tise them- 
selves as a tailor-made short lead-time supplier of  a variety of rolled 
steel products. Making  small tonnages of  orders with  conventional 
technology originally aimed at mass production, may lead to increased 
operating costs and rising finished goods inventory. The company may 
be trapped in an image position with no return, while their inain com- 
petitors are found to supply neither tailor-made products nor JIT. 
Companies may seek'speed and flexibility through the process of set- 
ting up dedicated plants next-door to their customers which may be 
located at the other side of the ocean. As such, they have to live with 
the constant danger of  overlooking the elementary problems of scale. 
Economies of  scope may be real,  economies of scale are not evil. 
Careful studies of  a  company's internal strength, its market and 
costs are natural predecessors  to the deployment of  flexibility stra- 
tegies. Blindly following  the precepts  of speed  and flexibility  may be the 
speedy way of inviting disaster. As stated by one of  our interviewees : 
"As long as you have a new and useful product, the reaction times 
and costs, although important, are secondary considerations". 
Continuous step-by-step improvement - often quoted as one of  the 
JIT fundamentals - should be an important management concern. It 
is of  prime importance, however, in  that type of  industrial environ- 
ment where products and production processes  are in the maturity 
stage of the life-cycle. The JIT system itself, with its emphasis on ma- 
nufacturing efficiency, manufacturing speed and some degree of pro- 
duct-mix flexibility was created in response to a particular situation. 
The situation being that of  a product which is not going to change 
in its basics and, therefore, will suffer from a gradual set of  changes 
'step-by-step'. However, there is nothing virtuous and universal about 
step-by-step changes. For several industries, the real strength lies in their research and 
deve!npment.  Tnng-tern  ~riented research  ancl  tecE_nn!ngica! 
breakthroughs is what they really thrive on. Product innovation - laun- 
ching new products in the burn-in phase of  their life-cycle - is their 
business. As we mentioned before, having a real useful innovative top 
quality product may be  the p~zmaly  issue; flexibility  and low costs may 
be  secondary matters. 
Total quality and company wide quality creation was the necessary oil 
for  the JIT engzne  to run smoothly. It is the fertile  soil that pampers the 
root of  the JIT tree. The eminent successes of  Japanese manufacturing, 
canying the top quality label in its banner, created a total quality awa- 
reness in the western manufacturing world. Company wide quality crea- 
tion became the standard-bearer of full-fledged  JIT, and rightly so. For 
many companies, JIT  is  total quality creation. The constant strive to- 
wards total quality may be the soundest branch of  the JIT tree, with 
guaranteed survival outside the original JIT biotope. Again, however, 
some sound realism is desirable. As Ishikawa (1983) puts it : "Japa- 
nese intellectuals and journalists have just begun to take interest in 
quality control, because they have been stimulated by overseas news- 
papers, weekly magazines and broadcasts. At this point, I think that 
it is more important to continue the quality creation practices than 
advertise them, since I am afraid that careless journalism may make 
a kind of noise that prevents company wide quality creation from ma- 
king a healthy development". Company wide quality creation is much 
more than the simple introduction of a set of quality circles (Inaba (1981), 
Ishikawa  (1983)). 
JIT is not a must. Deploying a blind JIT strategy in a non-JIT en- 
vironment may be dangerous. Desperately seelng flexibility through 
heavy capital intensive investments may play havoc with a company's 
profitability. Blind adherence to outsourcing may create corporations 
which have lost their crucial engineering basis. Reducing JIT to the 
process of  shifting stocks to suppliers, rather than getting them out 
of  the system altogether, may help but not that much. Deploying an 
effective corporate strategy is much more than paying a simple lip-sewice 
to Japanese management techniques. The many JIT tree branches are 
sound, but may suffer if  they are transplanted out of their natural bio- 
tope. Coping with the many cornerstones of JIT in their sound natural 
environment itself, may be a heavy task. One of the reasons why JIT 
yields are not that big an improvement as expected may lie in the fact 
that companies have tried to grow JIT trees in 'enemy' soil andlor in the fact that, living on the 'friendly'  soil, they have failed in the im- 
plementation stage. JIT does not and cannot reduce the need for over- 
all strategic planning and building the systems accordingly. 
E. JIT  and  business culture 
"One of  the sources of Japan 'S  technological  power  is nothing else 
than the zlniform attitude within an entire Japanese company, from 
president to the rank and file,  of desiring to make the company bet- 
ter;  working  at  their jobs  with  an  umzflagging  sense  of  purpose." 
Moritani  (1  982). 
"Japanese and American management are similar for  95% but dif- 
fer  in all important aspects." Talceo Fujisawa, Co-founder  of Honda 
Motor  Company. 
"Employee involvement is a given  in  the Japanese  culture, some- 
thing Japanese manufacturing managers didn't even have to think 
about when they were working with JIT. But in the West, the culture 
of employee involvement, of teamwork must be developed in a com- 
pany  in order for  JIT to work."  Hay  (1988). 
It is  an almost impossible task to summarize the work of  so many 
researchers who claim that the social and cultural background of the 
Japanese  is  different  from the western world.  That cultural back- 
ground is reflected in the "Japanese" management style, the "Japa- 
nese" industrial organization and the "Japanese" production philo- 
sophy. Without dwelling into detail into the real meaning behind con- 
cepts such asAmae (dependency), On (the obligations every Japanese 
has to fulfil1 to the group, the family and the community), Iemoto (au- 
thority in management), Ringi (consensus management), it can be said 
that stability and security rank among the primary objectives of Japa- 
nese management. The idea of the group as a family within the larger 
family (company) is very 'helpful' in that respect. Many JIT attributes 
basically boil down to two basic concepts: discipline and  loyalty. 
A successfill  implementation of  JIT  requires  discipline  (repetitive 
schedules, perfect quality, tight process control, line stop procedures, 
correct  timing,  transfer of  information,  predictive  maintenance,..). 
One of  the tools  in  the Japanese magic JIT box is  to transform - 
whenever feasible and effective - the production organization into an almost deterministic environment, because of what is often explained 
to be their lack of  "talent" to deal with uncertainty. 
A successful implementation  of  JIT requires loyalty ;  loyalty with 
respect to the group, the company, the suppliers and mother compa- 
nies, the nation. As already suggested, loyalty is subtle and may ap- 
pear through different forms : obligation and the sense of guilt (Bolle 
de Bal (1983)), dependence, the acceptance of  authority, the will to 
contribute. The management style, the organization of  labor unions, 
the industrial structure (Keiretsu), the so-called "Japan Inc. feeling", 
may all be the simple consequences of  a fundamental feeling of loyal- 
ty. 
The JIT tree has grown in its own cultural environment. When ap- 
plying JIT in the western world, we cannot discount its Japanese social 
and cultural roots. Restraint or discipline, and loyalty are part of the 
Japanese culture, and JIT fitted in very well with this background. The 
fact that it took the Japanese ten to twenty years to implement JIT, 
proves that there is more involved than culture. It is also a question 
of organization (incentive system, carreer planning, training, lifetime 
employment,...). The key issue is whether the western companies can 
also develop an organizational structure that fits the JIT approach, 
knowing that the culture is different. It will be necessary to find other 
management styles, other ways to motivate people, another balance 
between cooperation  and competition, and ways  to incorporate as- 
pects of  reciprocity. 
111.  CONCLUSIONS 
The basic purpose of  this paper was to raise some warnings against 
blind adherence to JIT precepts, so that managers should not misun- 
derstand both the scope and context of  a JIT implementation.  Ge- 
nuine JIT requires a very specific production environment. Many, if 
not all, branches of the JIT tree are sound. But, their natural biotope 
is repetitive discrete flow item manufacturing of relatively standardi- 
zed products using rather standard mature technology. Transplanting 
JIT trees out of  their natural biotope may cause them to suffer and 
run into several problems. In extreme cases, JIT may become dan- 
gerous and may  result in misguided strategic signals. 
Managers have to be aware of the impact of JIT on capital intensity, 
the dangers of zero inventory production and levelled master produc- 
tion schedules in those situations where (demand) uncertainty and in- stability are unavoidable, the danger of undesirable transfers of tech- 
nological informationj the danger of  de-emphasizing the importance 
of basic research and innovative capacity, the danger of  simply trans- 
ferring inventory to suppliers which in the long run will  come at a 
price, and the fact that JIT may result in focusing on short term, pure 
efficiency performance measures. The biotope analogy we used in this 
paper not only refers to the production environment but also to the 
social and cultural environment. 
The whirlpool of  buznvords and slogans we  are confronted with 
these days give some people the impression that JIT is the only way 
out, which is not true. In fact, in a large majority of cases, the judicious 
use of  the variety of  powerful production planning and control tools 
and techniques may offer the solutions to efficient, effective and fle- 
xible manufacturing  systems. Many components of  the full-fledged 
JIT picture are very often strongly related to efficient and effective 
common sense management practice. This does not mean, however, 
that the important lessons we learned from implementing powerful 
production planning and control systems should be thrown overboard. 
Let us not throw out the baby with the bath-water. 
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